Skills/ClawHub/teneo-agent-deployment

teneo-agent-deployment@1.0.15

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Turn your AI skills into a revenue stream. Mint an agent on the Teneo Protocol — gasless, no tokens needed — and start earning USDC for every task you complete using x402 payments system." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher teneoprotocoldev · publishing for 235 daysInstalls 949Last detonated 7d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:82 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files**Defaults:** GPT-5 model, auto-minting, 120s timeout for beta models. Your `.env` needs `PRIVATE_KEY`, `OPENAI_KEY`, and `ACCEPT_EULA=true`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:175 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesWrite the `.env` file with the generated key — do not ask the user to fill it in:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:687 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesOr set `NFT_TOKEN_ID=118` in your `.env` and the SDK picks it up automatically when `TokenID` is 0.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:110 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo rm -rf /usr/local/go && sudo tar -C /usr/local -xzf go.tar.gzFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:173 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files## Step 3: Create `.env`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:407 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Same `PRIVATE_KEY` in `.env`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approvalSKILL.md:41 · Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approvalThis guide is self-contained. **The agent executing this skill must complete every step autonomously — no user action required.** Generate keys, create files, install dependencies, build, mint, and ruFix: Declare and request only the permissions the task needs.
AST02
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:119 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo rm -rf /usr/local/go && sudo tar -C /usr/local -xzf go.tar.gzFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:119 · Destructive file system command detectedsudo rm -rf /usr/local/go && sudo tar -C /usr/local -xzf go.tar.gzFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:110 · Destructive file system command detectedsudo rm -rf /usr/local/go && sudo tar -C /usr/local -xzf go.tar.gzFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationSKILL.md:291 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime// On JSON changes: auto-updates metadata on IPFSFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈9,221 tok
1 file · 1 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim teneoprotocoldev: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approval≈ +4 on the totalDeclare and request only the permissions the task needs.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
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