Skills/ClawHub/tencentcloud-lighthouse-skill

tencentcloud-lighthouse-skill@1.0.2

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Load when: user mentions Lighthouse, 轻量应用服务器, 轻量服务器, or asks to check/create/manage/deploy Lighthouse instances, deploy applications to Lighthouse, manage Li..." Observed in sandbox: sends data to metadata.tencentyun.com.

Registry ClawHubPublisher lhanyun · publishing for 195 daysInstalls 13,630Last detonated 6 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: sends data to metadata.tencentyun.com.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexited 1:
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1snetworkGET http://metadata.tencentyun.com/meta-data/instance-name · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1snetworkGET http://metadata.tencentyun.com/meta-data/instance-id · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/tr
0.1sprocess2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscript/tccli-oauth-helper.sh:52 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " CentOS: sudo yum install -y ${missing[*]}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscript/tccli-oauth-helper.sh:51 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " Ubuntu: sudo apt-get install -y ${missing[*]}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,150 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim lhanyun: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim lhanyunPropose a patch to the maintainer