Skills/ClawHub/telegram-footer-patch

telegram-footer-patch@1.0.11

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Add a Telegram private-chat footer (`🧠 Model + 💭 Think + 📊 Context`) to OpenClaw replies, with dry-run preview, backup, syntax validation, rollback, and r..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher c-joey · publishing for 219 daysInstalls 2,200Last detonated 1 h ago
$clawhub install telegram-footer-patch
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 2: [err] dist directory not found: /usr/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 2: [err] dist directory not found: /usr/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexited 2: [err] dist directory not found: /usr/lib/node_modules/openclaw/dist
0.2sprocess3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/patch_reply_footer.py:210 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(["node", "--check", str(path)], capture_output=True, text=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/patch_reply_footer.py:132 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst homeDir = typeof process !== "undefined" && process?.env?.HOME ? process.env.HOME : "/root";Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/revert_reply_footer.py:28 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(["node", "--check", str(path)], capture_output=True, text=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/patch_reply_footer.py:391 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesprint(f"[err] no write permission for dist directory: {dist} (try sudo or adjust permissions)", file=sys.stderr)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,229 tok
1 file · 7 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

telegram-footer-patch@1.0.11 safety verdict: Verified (install only) — KillerSkills