Skills/ClawHub/telegram-cloud-storage

telegram-cloud-storage@1.8.2

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "A high-performance Telegram Cloud Storage solution using Teldrive. Turns Telegram into an unlimited cloud drive with a local API/UI." Observed in sandbox: sends data to release-assets.githubusercontent.com.

Registry ClawHubPublisher oki3505f · publishing for 292 daysInstalls 3,515Last detonated 36 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: sends data to release-assets.githubusercontent.com.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/cp
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'requests'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4snetworkCONNECT tcp://github.com:443
0.4snetworkCONNECT tcp://release-assets.githubusercontent.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/tar
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/mv
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.5sprocessexited 1:
0.5sprocess3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.5sprocessexited 1:

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/manage.sh:12 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif [ -f "$PID_FILE" ] && kill -0 $(cat "$PID_FILE") 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install_binary.sh:17 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$BIN_DIR/teldrive"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/manage.sh:36 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$PID"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/manage.sh:34 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif kill -0 "$PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/manage.sh:45 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif [ -f "$PID_FILE" ] && kill -0 $(cat "$PID_FILE") 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈582 tok
1 file · 7 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim oki3505f: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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