teable-assistant-ops@1.10.0
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Operate Teable projects — tables, fields, views, records, SQL queries, automations, headless routines, apps, image generation, and web scraping. Trigger when user mentions Cuppy, Teable, teable CLI, or Teable-style IDs (bseXXX, tblXXX, fldXXX, recXXX, viwXXX), or wants to manage tables/fields/records, build dashboards/apps, generate images or charts, create automations, import/export data, trigger AI fill, or scrape websites (LinkedIn, Amazon, YouTube, etc.) — even if they don't explicitly say "Teable" but are clearly working with a Teable project (called base in the API)." Observed in sandbox: reads credential files.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-26 and scored it 59/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: reads credential files.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 1 scenariosStatic findings
No findings across 5,254 lines in 42 files.
What would make this Verified
21 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim littleben: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.