tauri-2-app@1.0.1
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Scaffold a new Tauri 2 desktop app (Rust backend + TypeScript/React frontend) using a thin-frontend / rich-Rust-backend architecture with modular commands, trait-based platform abstractions, encrypted secrets at rest, single-instance enforcement, a self-hosted updater, and a cross-platform CI matrix. Three modes: full project scaffold, add a Tauri command slice, add a Rust module slice. Use this skill whenever the user says "create a new Tauri app", "scaffold a Tauri 2 project", "new desktop app with Tauri", "Tauri + React project", "add a Tauri command end-to-end", "add a Rust module to my Tauri app", "my Tauri conventions", or "/tauri-2-app" — even if they don't name the skill. Full good-pattern catalog and pitfall list live in the skill body." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 56/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
Without these, the permission prompt never shows and the call returns "denied".Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent..gitignore # MUST include src-tauri/target/, dist/, .env, *.backup, *.orig, *.tempFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose..env.example # NEVER .env — only .env.example committedFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- ❌ `.env` committed to git. Only `.env.example` is tracked; `.env` is in `.gitignore`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- If a generator IS run (`create-tauri-app` at the user's insistence, `npx @tauri-apps/cli icon`, `tauri signer generate`) and its output differs from this skill's layout: **Tauri wins on file locatioFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.- For icons, run `npx @tauri-apps/cli icon <path-to-source.png>` once a source image exists, or generate a 1024×1024 placeholder with `sharp` if the user wants. Do **not** commit a placeholder square Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.- ❌ Inventing a Tauri updater pubkey. The user generates one with `npx tauri signer generate -w ~/.tauri/myapp.key` and pastes the public key into `tauri.conf.json`. Never paste another project's pubkFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.**Fix:** Set an explicit CSP that whitelists `tauri://localhost` plus any external origins the app legitimately uses. If `null` is required, add a comment in `tauri.conf.json` (JSON doesn't support coFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.- Reply with a short summary: project path, versions chosen, plugins wired, bundle identifier, next steps (e.g. "fill in the macOS `Info.plist` usage descriptions for any permissions you'll request", Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.4. `src-tauri/icons/` — placeholder 1024×1024 PNG **only** if the user hasn't supplied one. Surface as TODO; tell them to run `npx @tauri-apps/cli icon icons/icon.png`.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
24 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim dennisrongo: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.