Skills/ClawHub/task-dispatch

task-dispatch@1.1.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Task scheduling and dispatching for task boards. Use when setting up periodic task dispatch, checking for dispatchable tasks, creating subagents to execute t..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher cccaptain0129 · publishing for 239 daysInstalls 865Last detonated 23 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:58 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "TASKBOARD_ACCESS_TOKEN=$TOKEN" >> ~/.openclaw/workspace-<name>/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:54 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesTOKEN=$(cat ~/ClawBoard/.env | grep BOARD_ACCESS_TOKEN | cut -d= -f2)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandSKILL.md:137 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes| Port 5173 in use | `lsof -i :5173` then kill process |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:50 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files在 Agent 工作目录创建 `.env` 文件:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collects environment variables by secret-like namesSKILL.md:54 · Collects environment variables by secret-like namesTOKEN=$(cat ~/ClawBoard/.env | grep BOARD_ACCESS_TOKEN | cut -d= -f2)Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:57 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "TASKBOARD_API_URL=http://127.0.0.1:3000" >> ~/.openclaw/workspace-<name>/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 生成访问 token(自动保存到 .env)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandSKILL.md:136 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes| Port 3000 in use | `lsof -i :3000` then kill process |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,313 tok
1 file · 6 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cccaptain0129: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Collects environment variables by secret-like names≈ +4 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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