swarm-arena@1.0.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Autonomous 24/7 perpetual-futures trading agent for the Lighter exchange. Runs a full indicator/confluence pipeline (5m/1h/4h), risk-based sizing, mandatory reduce-only SL/TP brackets, a bounded self-learning loop, and cron-driven operation with hard safety rails: daily loss limit, exposure and notional caps, halt + circuit breaker, and a one-way human consent gate for fully autonomous live trading. Paper mode works stdlib-only with zero order writes. Use when the user wants to run, configure, monitor, or operate the swarmArena trading agent on Lighter." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 58/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
except Exception as e: # model bugs must not kill the arenaFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.cat candles.json | python3 compute_features.pyFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.| `risk-policy.md` | Hard gates, sizing math, kill rules |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.5. Write config.json (atomic, chmod 600).Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.except Exception as e: # one bad symbol must not kill the cycleFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""envfile.py — minimal .env loader, stdlib only.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.CLI: cat payload.json | python3 compute_confluence.pyFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.envfile.load(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))), ".env"))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.procs = [subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-c", worker]) for _ in range(2)]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# auto-load per-model credentials from <skill>/.env (never config.json);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.CLI: cat features.json | python3 compute_signal.pyFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
22 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim swarm-arena: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.