Skills/ClawHub/ssh-remote

ssh-remote@0.1.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Connect to remote Linux servers through SSH and execute commands non-interactively. Covers password authentication, key authentication, file transfer, and cr..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher agilebuilder · publishing for 139 daysInstalls 700Last detonated 2d ago

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:113 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"mkdir -p ~/.ssh && echo '$(cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub)' >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFor first-time production connections, ask the user to confirm the host fingerprint or add the host key to `~/.ssh/known_hosts` first:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:64 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/ssh_pass.shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:55 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 700 /tmp/ssh_pass.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorySKILL.md:113 · References a credential file in the home directory"mkdir -p ~/.ssh && echo '$(cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub)' >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Reads credential paths from the home directorySKILL.md:113 · Reads credential paths from the home directory"mkdir -p ~/.ssh && echo '$(cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub)' >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:86 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 700 /tmp/.sp$$.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:179 · Destructive file system command detected1. Delete temporary password scripts immediately: `rm -f /tmp/ssh_pass.sh`.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:110 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 700 /tmp/ssh_pass.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorySKILL.md:100 · References a credential file in the home directoryssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 -N "" -C "auto-deploy"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:114 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/ssh_pass.shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesssh-keyscan -H SERVER_IP >> ~/.ssh/known_hostsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:180 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions2. Use `chmod 700` for temporary password scripts.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:100 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 -N "" -C "auto-deploy"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:91 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/.sp$$.shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,625 tok
1 file · 2 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim agilebuilder: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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