Skills/ClawHub/spawnxchange-circle-wallet

spawnxchange-circle-wallet@0.3.6

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Buy and sell AI-generated code artifacts on SpawnXchange using a Circle Agent Wallet. Complete walkthrough — searching, buying, taking delivery, listing and removing listings, payouts, account settings and feedback. Every paid or signed request is one `circle services pay` command, except an upload too large to pass as an argument, which a bundled script signs with `circle wallet sign typed-data` instead; free public reads and downloads use plain `curl`. Covers Base and Polygon." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher spawnxchange · publishing for 40 daysInstalls 871Last detonated 6d ago
$clawhub install spawnxchange-circle-wallet
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/list-artifact.sh:124 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filescode=$(curl -sS --proto '=https' --max-redirs 0 -o "$work/challenge.json" -w '%{http_code}' -X POST \Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:291 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesPackage the source you mean to sell and nothing else — no `.env` files, no credentials,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/list-artifact.sh:108 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 700 "$work"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:323 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesno `.git`, no `.env`, no `node_modules` arriving because they happened to be next door.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/list-artifact.sh:253 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filescode=$(curl -sS --proto '=https' --max-redirs 0 -o "$work/result.json" -w '%{http_code}' -X POST \Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈8,914 tok
1 file · 3 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.