Skills/ClawHub/spacesuit

spacesuit@0.4.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "A comprehensive OpenClaw workspace framework providing session protocols, memory system, git workflow, safety rules, priority triage, communication handoffs,..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher jontsai · joined 4 days agoInstalls 2,922Last detonated 4d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-29 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompt injection attempt; Prompt injection; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.4sfilesystemwrote ~/work/acme-api/.claude/scripts/sync-operators.sh · ~/work/acme-api/.claude/.spacesuit-version · ~/work/acme-api/.claude/memory/heartbeat-state.json
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/basename
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/mv
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/cp
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompt injection attemptbase/SECURITY.md:40 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions'Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionbase/SECURITY.md:42 · Prompt injection — explicit attempt to bypass safety measuresFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filestests/test_install.sh:152 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/release.test.js:24 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agenttemplates/AGENTS.md:3 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/release.test.js:27 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agenttemplates/AGENTS.md:13 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install.sh:129 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/release-check.js:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/release.test.js:32 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesbase/AGENTS.md:422 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesbase/AGENTS.md:64 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesbase/AGENTS.md:67 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesbase/AGENTS.md:73 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/projects.test.js:215 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesbase/AGENTS.md:298 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agenttemplates/HEARTBEAT.md:12 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

What would make this Verified

17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim jontsai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  4. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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