Skills/ClawHub/sogni-creative-agent-skill

sogni-creative-agent-skill@3.68.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "CLI and agent skill for personal LoRAs, image, video, and music generation using Sogni AI's decentralized GPU network. Supports Pixal3D single- and multi-view image-to-GLB, BiRefNet background removal, Qwen3-TTS speech/voice cloning/design, MiniMax Music 3, SAM 3 object selection, promptless RTX VSR image upscaling through 16K, promptless FlashVSR and RelayVSR video upscaling up to 2160p, one-click image-folder loop reels, personas (people with saved photos and voices), persistent memories, custom personality, style transfer, angle synthesis, MiniMax H3/H3 Balanced/LightX2V Turbo/FastH3 Turbo (including audio-to-video from an uploaded track)/Seedance/HappyHorse/LTX/WAN video, music/lyrics, hosted chat, durable workflows, replay records, and multi-step creative workflows. Ask the agent to "draw", "generate", "create an image", "upscale an image", "upscale a video", "make a video/animate", "turn this image folder into a loop", "make music", "build a playable world", "apply a style", or "generate me as a superhero"." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher sogni-ai · publishing for 25 daysInstalls 838Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 3.67.0

vet-skills diff sogni-creative-agent-skill 3.67.0 3.68.0

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 3.67.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentreferences/video-prompting.md:127 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentGenerated by npm run sync:prompt-guides from @sogni-ai/sogni-intelligence-client 4.29.0; edit the rules there, not here.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentreferences/video-prompting.md:182 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentGenerated by npm run sync:prompt-guides from @sogni-ai/sogni-intelligence-client 4.29.0; edit the rules there, not here.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentreferences/image-prompting.md:67 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentGenerated by npm run sync:prompt-guides from @sogni-ai/sogni-intelligence-client 4.29.0; edit the rules there, not here.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Fake instruction boundary tagreferences/models.md:1414 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction filesogni-agent --json --video -m minimax-h3-fasth3-i2v-turbo --ref first.png --keyframe turn.png@3 --keyframe wave.png@6 --duration 8 --estimate-video-cost "<prompt>"Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:74 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code…rs on stdout. ## Uninstall Request Policy When a user asks to uninstall, run `npx setup-sogni-agent-skill --uninstall --remove-cli --purge`. This removes the skill files, the global CLI…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:39 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code… this `SKILL.md` and invoke the `sogni-agent` CLI. The one-command alternative `npx setup-sogni-agent-skill --version=latest` auto-detects Claude Code, Codex CLI, and Hermes (it does not …Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandupdate-check.mjs:83 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges: 'run `sudo sogni-agent self-update`';Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Fake instruction boundary tagreferences/seamless-tiling.md:78 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction filesogni-agent -m krea2_turbo_fp8_scaled -w 1024 -h 1024 -n 4 -o tile.png "<prompt>"Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:86 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 ~/.config/sogni/credentialsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Unpinned dependencySKILL.md:35 · Unpinned dependencynpm install -g @sogni-ai/sogni-creative-agent-skill@latestFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:41 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code…(it does not configure Goose or OpenClaw). For Goose, install this skill with `npx skills add Sogni-AI/sogni-creative-agent-skill --global --agent goose --skill sogni-cr…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentreferences/video-prompting.md:977 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentGenerated by npm run sync:prompt-guides from @sogni-ai/sogni-intelligence-client 4.29.0; edit the rules there, not here.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈19,829 tok
3 files · 56 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sogni-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Unpinned dependencies≈ +1 on the totalPin exact versions (and ideally hashes) in package.json, requirements or the install script so the bundle cannot change under you.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim sogni-aiPropose a patch to the maintainer