Skills/ClawHub/smart-updater

smart-updater@1.1.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Intelligent upgrade management for OpenClaw skills, extensions, and core. HITL (Human-in-the-Loop) mode: scan installed assets, read changelogs, analyze risk..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher yuanhui · publishing for 251 daysInstalls 1,203Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 69/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Destructive file system command detected; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sfilesystemwrote ~/.openclaw/inventory.json
0.0sprocessexited 1: ./scripts/inventory.sh: line 41: /tmp/ks-detonate-MkPTTR/scripts/home/.openclaw/inventory.json: No such file or directory
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexited 1: ❌ inventory.json not found. Run inventory.sh first.
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 2: Usage: upgrade.sh <asset-name> [--target <version>] [--dry-run]
0.1sprocess3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/upgrade.sh:460 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /tmp/jiti/Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/upgrade.sh:311 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /tmp/jiti/Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/upgrade.sh:155 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /tmp/jiti/Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/scan.sh:39 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/inventory.sh:324 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/smart-updater-count.txtFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedscripts/scan.sh:269 · OS command execution function call detected"scanTime": os.popen("date -u +'%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ'").read().strip(),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,693 tok
1 file · 9 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

11 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim yuanhui: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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