Skills/ClawHub/smart-photo-editor

smart-photo-editor@1.5.2

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "AI-powered photo editing and restoration skill - smart object removal, background removal, old photo restoration, and basic edits." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher guoxh · publishing for 154 daysInstalls 1,673Last detonated 4d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 58/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/edit.py:901 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/edit.py:857 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/edit.py:16 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files./edit.py --json < tasks.json # Batch mode with JSON inputFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:162 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges| **imagemagick** | ✅ Required | Basic image editing (resize, crop, format conversion, color adjustments) | `sudo apt install imagemagick` (Debian/Ubuntu) or `brew install imagemagick` (macOS) |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/edit.py:847 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([cmd_candidate, "--help"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/exif_utils.py:340 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([cmd, "-strip", output, output],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/remove_bg.sh:66 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " sudo apt install imagemagick # Debian/Ubuntu"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:191 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Add to your shell profile or ~/.openclaw/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/edit.py:392 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/edit.py:874 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([cmd_candidate, "--version"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈10,228 tok
1 file · 9 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

22 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim guoxh: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim guoxhPropose a patch to the maintainer