Skills/ClawHub/skillscout

skillscout@0.1.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Find and evaluate OpenClaw AI skills by trust score and security reviews before installation or recommendation." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher nashbot67 · publishing for 266 daysInstalls 1,223Last detonated 37 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 9 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: ./scripts/fetch-skill.sh: line 9: 1: Usage: fetch-skill.sh <author>/<skill-name>
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ./scripts/harden-skill.sh: line 8: 1: Usage: harden-skill.sh <skill-name>
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1: ./scripts/review-skill.sh: line 12: 1: Usage: review-skill.sh <author>/<skill-name>
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: ./scripts/scan-blocklists.sh: line 8: 1: Usage: scan-blocklists.sh <skill-name>
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.3sprocess8 of 9 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive file system command detecteddata/skills.json:1693 · Destructive file system command detected"details": "cooldown.sh uses eval \"$COMMAND\" with unquoted variable. Attacker can inject shell commands via COMMAND parameter. e.g., COMMAND='true; rm -rf /' would execute."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detecteddata/skills.json:1680 · Python subprocess execution detected"subprocess.run() in orchestrator.py calls execute_financial_analyst() and execute_notification_agent() (simulated)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdata/skills.json:977 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"Credential storage in .env file",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:38 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx @skillscout/mcpFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdata/skills.json:916 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"details": "No encryption for SQLite database or .env file. Credentials are stored in plaintext."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:57 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code- Before running `npx clawhub@latest install <skill>`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddata/skills.json:1615 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"Restrict ~/.clawdbot/events/ directory to user-only permissions (chmod 700)",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detecteddata/skills.json:1412 · Python subprocess execution detected"python3 subprocess.run() for sessions_spawn integration"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicedata/skills.json:1693 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device"details": "cooldown.sh uses eval \"$COMMAND\" with unquoted variable. Attacker can inject shell commands via COMMAND parameter. e.g., COMMAND='true; rm -rf /' would execute."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detecteddata/skills.json:1542 · Python subprocess execution detected"subprocess.run(['node', str(script_path)], timeout=60)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdata/skills.json:841 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"finding": "API keys for OpenAI/LiteLLM stored in .env file; no authentication between local API server and clients (port 8000, localhost only but no auth token required)."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdata/skills.json:881 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env file (credentials)",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdata/skills.json:996 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"finding": "Password stored in /home/eth3rnit3/clawd/.env (plaintext); API authentication via JWT cookie. Risk: credential exposure in .env file or cookies."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detecteddata/skills.json:1498 · Python subprocess execution detected"Executes arbitrary scripts via subprocess.run()",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddata/skills.json:1474 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"Restrict memory/diary/ directory permissions to user-only (chmod 700)",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detecteddata/skills.json:1541 · Python subprocess execution detected"subprocess.run(['python3', str(script_path)], timeout=60) in workflow_engine.py",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedata/skills.json:22 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"installCommand": "npx clawhub@latest install rationality",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddata/skills.json:1617 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"Add timeout for workflow execution with kill of hung processes",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondata/skills.json:76 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"finding": "API key stored in plaintext in config files (~/.config/4claw/credentials.json). Thread content fetched includes full post text by default. No encryption in transit mentioned."Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondata/skills.json:439 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files… "OAuth token stored in plaintext at ~/.openclaw/agents/main/agent/auth-profiles.json. API responses contain quota information for all models. Script output includes model names and reset times." }, "denialOfService"…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagemcp/server.js:153 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeinstall: `npx clawhub@latest install ${s.author}/${s.name}`,Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondata/skills.json:1020 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"curl -s -c /tmp/alexandrie_cookies.txt -X POST",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagemcp-server/index.js:215 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code`Install: \`npx clawhub@latest install ${s.name}\``Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagemcp/server.js:119 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeinstall: `npx clawhub@latest install ${s.author}/${s.name}`,Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈573 tok
1 file · 31 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim nashbot67: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim nashbot67Propose a patch to the maintainer