Is skills-manager-cli@2.2.0 safe to install?

Skills/ClawHub/skills-manager-cli

skills-manager-cli@2.2.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Drive the Skills Manager CLI (`skm`) to initialize the hub, adopt unmanaged skills, list/enable/disable skills per AI tool, and doctor/fix symlink sync. Use whenever the user or an agent needs to manage skills from a terminal, SSH session, CI job, or headless machine; when a skill is missing in Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Gemini, OpenCode, or any other supported tool; when asked to run skm / Skills Manager CLI; or when setting up Skills Manager without the GUI. Do not use for `npx skills` / skills.sh search (different CLI), for writing SKILL.md content (skill-creator), or for marketplace browse/install (not in skm)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher jiweiyeah · publishing for 77 daysInstalls 413Last detonated 30 h ago

$clawhub install skills-manager-cli

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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.

Tested: every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested: use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations

t+CategoryObserved action

0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle

0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW

Prompt injectionreferences/tools.md:65 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file`enable` tries, in order: directory symlink (Developer Mode or elevated) →Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.

AST01

MEDIUM

npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:10 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codewithout the GUI. Do not use for `npx skills` / skills.sh search (differentFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.

AST06

MEDIUM

npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:221 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code| Search / install from skills.sh | `npx skills` / find-skills, or the GUI Marketplace |Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.

AST06

MEDIUM

npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:46 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeDo not fall back to `npx skills` — that is a different, unrelated CLI.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.

AST06

LOW

Authorization escalation languagereferences/tools.md:65 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file`enable` tries, in order: directory symlink (Developer Mode or elevated) →Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.

AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded

≈2,680 tok

1 file · 4 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.