Skills/ClawHub/skillboss-3

skillboss-3@0.1.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Multi-AI gateway for fullstack apps. Build/deploy websites, React apps, SaaS, ecommerce to Cloudflare Workers. DB (D1/KV/R2), Stripe payments/subscriptions/c..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher renjie-liu · publishing for 253 daysInstalls 878Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 51/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration; Credential pass-through configuration; Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationscripts/api-hub.js:764 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime// Auto-update check after successful command execution (skip for version command itself)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationscripts/product-manager.js:183 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials// Build URL with optional Vercel bypass token for stagingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationscripts/api-hub.js:775 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime* Check for updates and AUTO-UPDATE if new version availableFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationscripts/product-manager.js:61 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials// Parse base URL and any query params (e.g., Vercel bypass token)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/api-hub.js:523 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Video saved to: ${args.output}`)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Authorization escalation languageworkflows/ecommerce/README.md:258 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file4. **Admin bypass** - use `USER_EMAIL` carefully, only for testing/admin accessFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationscripts/stripe-connect.js:37 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials// Parse base URL and any query params (e.g., Vercel bypass token for staging)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationscripts/stripe-connect.js:44 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials* Build URL with optional Vercel bypass token for stagingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/serve-build.js:816 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Files uploaded: ${result.fileCount}`)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/api-hub.js:436 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Transformed image saved to: ${args.output}`)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/api-hub.js:413 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Upscaled image saved to: ${args.output}`)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/serve-build.js:657 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`\nUploading to: ${apiUrl}/upload-worker`)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/serve-build.js:453 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Skip hidden files (except .env)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/serve-build.js:454 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif (entry.name.startsWith('.') && entry.name !== '.env') {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/api-hub.js:355 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Audio saved to: ${args.output}`)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Authorization escalation languagetemplates/worker-ecommerce/README.md:256 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file**Admin access not working?**Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/serve-build.js:231 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`\nUploading to: ${apiUrl}/upload-static`)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/serve-build.js:837 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Files uploaded: ${result.fileCount}`)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/api-hub.js:391 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Image saved to: ${args.output}`)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,315 tok
1 file · 99 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

29 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim renjie-liu: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  3. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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