skillboss-2@0.1.4
BLOCKED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Multi-AI gateway for fullstack apps. Build/deploy websites, React apps, SaaS, ecommerce to Cloudflare Workers. DB (D1/KV/R2), Stripe payments/subscriptions/c..." Observed in sandbox: reads credential files, sends data to heyboss.ai.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 19 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 28/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Credential pass-through configuration; Credential pass-through configuration; Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration. Summary: reads credential files, sends data to heyboss.ai.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 16 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
// Parse base URL and any query params (e.g., Vercel bypass token)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// Build URL with optional Vercel bypass token for stagingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* Check for updates and AUTO-UPDATE if new version availableFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// Auto-update check after successful command execution (skip for version command itself)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.console.log(`Files uploaded: ${result.fileCount}`)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.* Build URL with optional Vercel bypass token for stagingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.**Admin access not working?**Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.console.log(`Audio saved to: ${args.output}`)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log(`\nUploading to: ${apiUrl}/upload-static`)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log(`Files uploaded: ${result.fileCount}`)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.// Skip hidden files (except .env)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.4. **Admin bypass** - use `USER_EMAIL` carefully, only for testing/admin accessFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.console.log(`Image saved to: ${args.output}`)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.if (entry.name.startsWith('.') && entry.name !== '.env') {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.console.log(`Video saved to: ${args.output}`)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.// Parse base URL and any query params (e.g., Vercel bypass token for staging)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.console.log(`Transformed image saved to: ${args.output}`)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log(`Upscaled image saved to: ${args.output}`)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log(`\nUploading to: ${apiUrl}/upload-worker`)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
52 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%An override rule (credential_read_plus_egress) caps this verdict regardless of the score. The first item below has to go before anything else counts.
- Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs.
- Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim yshuolu: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.