Skills/ClawHub/skill-validator

skill-validator@1.0.11

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "技能检验工具:基于ClawHub技能格式规范的验证工具,确保技能符合最新发布要求。自动检测格式问题,提供修复建议,与ClawHub规范同步更新。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher puppetcat-fire · publishing for 250 daysInstalls 1,457Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexited 1:
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocess4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.2sprocessexited 1:

Static findings

HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLSKILL.md:290 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcecurl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/puppetcat-fire/skill-publish-adapter/main/skill-publish-adapter.sh -o adapter.shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLSKILL.md:78 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcecurl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/puppetcat-fire/skill-publish-adapter/main/skill-publish-adapter.sh -o skill-publish-adapter.shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:40 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo ln -sf "$SCRIPT_DIR/skill-validator.sh" /usr/local/bin/skill-validator 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceinstall.sh:78 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device"rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:15 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " 请安装: sudo apt-get install $cmd # Debian/Ubuntu"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:41 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo ln -sf "$SCRIPT_DIR/skill-validator.sh" /usr/local/bin/validate-skill 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedinstall.sh:78 · Destructive file system command detected"rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:305 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get install jq # Ubuntu/DebianFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:161 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$EXAMPLE_DIR/install.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:311 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x skill-publish-adapter.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:79 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"chmod 777",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:79 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x skill-publish-adapter.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:35 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$SCRIPT_DIR/skill-validator.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:291 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x adapter.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:312 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x ./my-skill/*.sh # 修复技能脚本权限Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,961 tok
1 file · 8 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim puppetcat-fire: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim puppetcat-firePropose a patch to the maintainer