skill-validator@1.0.11
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "技能检验工具:基于ClawHub技能格式规范的验证工具,确保技能符合最新发布要求。自动检测格式问题,提供修复建议,与ClawHub规范同步更新。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/puppetcat-fire/skill-publish-adapter/main/skill-publish-adapter.sh -o adapter.shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/puppetcat-fire/skill-publish-adapter/main/skill-publish-adapter.sh -o skill-publish-adapter.shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.sudo ln -sf "$SCRIPT_DIR/skill-validator.sh" /usr/local/bin/skill-validator 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo " 请安装: sudo apt-get install $cmd # Debian/Ubuntu"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo ln -sf "$SCRIPT_DIR/skill-validator.sh" /usr/local/bin/validate-skill 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo apt-get install jq # Ubuntu/DebianFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod +x "$EXAMPLE_DIR/install.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x skill-publish-adapter.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts."chmod 777",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x skill-publish-adapter.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x "$SCRIPT_DIR/skill-validator.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x adapter.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x ./my-skill/*.sh # 修复技能脚本权限Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim puppetcat-fire: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.