Skills/ClawHub/skill-trust-auditor

skill-trust-auditor@1.1.5

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Audit a named ClawHub skill or skill URL before installation by combining OpenClaw verification with bounded static analysis. Use when the user explicitly asks whether a skill is safe or requests a pre-install review; report evidence and uncertainty instead of treating a score as proof." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher jonathanjing · publishing for 103 daysInstalls 1,937Last detonated 5d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/awk
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/awk
0.2sprocessexited 1:

Static findings

CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/analyze_skill.py:413 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code"H012": "no curl | bash pattern",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesSKILL.md:99 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files- Instructions to modify `SOUL.md`/`AGENTS.md`/`openclaw.json`Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/patterns.json:128 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"regex": "(?:cat|read|open|source)\\s+['\"]?(?:\\./|\\.\\./|~/)?\\.env\\b",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/patterns.json:126 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"name": "Reading .env files",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/patterns.json:131 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"notes": ".env files are the most common secret storage location"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/patterns.json:122 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code"notes": "The classic curl | bash supply chain attack pattern"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/patterns.json:127 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"description": "Accessing .env files which typically contain secrets",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/patterns.json:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"regex": "\\bprocess\\.env\\b",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/patterns.json:122 · Remote installer piped to shell"notes": "The classic curl | bash supply chain attack pattern"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup.sh:18 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " Ubuntu: sudo apt install python3 python3-pip"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/analyze_skill.py:413 · Remote installer piped to shell"H012": "no curl | bash pattern",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/patterns.json:200 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"name": "chmod +x on script",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈869 tok
1 file · 11 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim jonathanjing: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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