Skills/ClawHub/skill-security-check

skill-security-check@1.3.1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "This skill should be used when evaluating the security of a ClawHub skill before installation. It performs comprehensive security risk assessment on skill di..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher tjefferson · publishing for 260 daysInstalls 877Last detonated 4d ago

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:93 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files4. **File system access**: Map all file/directory paths referenced — flag any access to sensitive locations (~/.ssh, Keychain, .env, etc.).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/scan_skill.py:68 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(r'\.env\b', "Accesses .env file (may contain secrets)"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/scan_skill.py:66 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(r'/etc/shadow', "Accesses system shadow password file"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/scan_skill.py:63 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(r'~/.ssh/', "Accesses SSH directory"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Reads credential paths from the home directorySKILL.md:93 · Reads credential paths from the home directory4. **File system access**: Map all file/directory paths referenced — flag any access to sensitive locations (~/.ssh, Keychain, .env, etc.).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
LOW
Prompt injection attemptreferences/threat_knowledge_base.md:47 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction file- 是否尝试覆盖/忽略之前的指令("ignore previous instructions")Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/scan_skill.py:65 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(r'/etc/passwd', "Accesses system password file"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:132 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges…ases (agent-directive language, external URL references, package installations, sudo usage). **Requires careful human review.** - **LOW**: Minor informational findin…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:131 · Remote installer piped to shell…not install.** - **HIGH**: Dangerous patterns present that could be weaponized (curl|bash, eval/exec usage, access to sensitive paths, persistence mechanisms). **Do not …Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,839 tok
1 file · 3 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim tjefferson: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim tjeffersonPropose a patch to the maintainer