Skills/ClawHub/skill-sec-scan

skill-sec-scan@4.4.1

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "自动检测并评分 ClawHub、GitHub 和本地 Skill 中 JS、TS、Python、Shell 文件的安全风险,识别数据泄露、注入、混淆和木马等威胁。" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher torchesfrms · publishing for 243 daysInstalls 1,359Last detonated 41 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 60/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsnode/scanner.js:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files{ pattern: /fs\.writeFileSync.*process\.env|fs\.writeFile.*password/, level: 'critical', score: 25, desc: '敏感文件写入' },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/scan.sh:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "$c" | grep -qE "process\.env\.(AWS_|AZURE_|STRIPE_)" && add_issue "EXFIL" "api-key" "critical" 30 "$f" "process.env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsnode/scanner.js:24 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files{ pattern: /process\.env\.(AWS_|AZURE_|STRIPE_|GOOGLE_)/, level: 'critical', score: 30, desc: 'API密钥' }Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:69 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference| INJECTION | 19 | cmd-execution、npx-exec、dynamic-exec、prompt-injection、jailbreak、backtick-injection、system-probing、crypto-operation |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/scan.sh:44 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeecho "$c" | grep -qE "npx |aibtc-worker" && add_issue "INJECTION" "npx-exec" "critical" 25 "$f" "npx"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/scan.sh:42 · Remote installer piped to shellecho "$c" | grep -qE "curl.*\|.*bash|wget.*\|.*bash" && add_issue "INJECTION" "remote-script" "critical" 30 "$f" "curl|bash"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
LOW
Prompt injectionSKILL_EN.md:26 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file…CTION | remote-script, cmd-execution, npx-exec, dynamic-exec, prompt-injection, jailbreak, dynamic-import, backtick-injection, system-probing, shell-injection, crypto-op…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionSKILL_EN.md:36 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file| INJECTION | 19 | cmd-execution, npx-exec, dynamic-exec, prompt-injection, jailbreak |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/scan.sh:471 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code4. **供应链攻击**:执行来源不明的外部包(如 npx 不固定版本、pip 安装未知包)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/scan.sh:187 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "$c" | grep -qE "writeFile.*\.env|writeFile.*config|\.config\." && add_issue "EXFIL" "config-write" "high" 20 "$f" "config-write"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionreferences/rules.md:30 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file| I07 | `DAN\|do anything now` | critical | DAN 越狱模式 |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/scan.sh:165 · Remote installer piped to shellecho "$c" | grep -qE "curl.*\|.*bash|wget.*\|.*bash" && add_issue "INJECTION" "remote-script" "critical" 30 "$f" "curl|bash"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
LOW
Prompt injectionreferences/rules.md:29 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file| I06 | `jailbreak\|bypass.*safety` | critical | 越狱攻击 |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/scan.sh:177 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesecho "$c" | grep -qE "kill\s+-+9|kill\s+-+KILL|pkill" && add_issue "TROJAN" "process-kill" "high" 20 "$f" "kill -9"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,661 tok
1 file · 13 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

20 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim torchesfrms: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim torchesfrmsPropose a patch to the maintainer