Skills/ClawHub/skill-sandbox

skill-sandbox@1.0.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Sandboxed ClawHub skill installation with automated security scanning. Use when: (1) Installing any new skill from ClawHub, (2) Auditing an already-installed..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher zurbrick · publishing for 257 daysInstalls 1,234Last detonated 2 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Pipe to network utility; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.0sprocessexited 1:
0.0sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:58 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions- Dangerous SKILL.md instructions (disable security, exfiltrate, reverse shells, chmod 777)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/skill-sandbox.sh:301 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesfinding "WARNING" "sudo usage in SKILL.md (requests elevated access):"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe to network utilityscripts/skill-sandbox.sh:289 · Pipe to network utility — potential reverse shell…*to.*server\|upload.*data\|rm -rf /\|delete.*all\|chmod 777\|0\.0\.0\.0\|mkfifo\|nc -l\|reverse.shell\|>/etc/\|curl.*|.*bash\|wget.*|.*sh" \ "$SKILL_MD" 2>/dev/…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/skill-sandbox.sh:298 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# Check for sudo usageFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/skill-sandbox.sh:289 · Destructive file system command detected…*guardrail\|skip.*auth\|exfiltrate\|phone.home\|send.*to.*server\|upload.*data\|rm -rf /\|delete.*all\|chmod 777\|0\.0\.0\.0\|mkfifo\|nc -l\|reverse.shell\|>/etc/\|curl…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/skill-sandbox.sh:262 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesENV_HITS=$(grep_code 'process\.env\|os\.environ\|os\.getenv\|API_KEY\|SECRET_KEY\|PRIVATE_KEY\|PASSWORD\|CREDENTIAL\|ACCESS_TOKEN')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/skill-sandbox.sh:299 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesSUDO_HITS=$(grep -in "sudo " "$SKILL_MD" 2>/dev/null || true)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/skill-sandbox.sh:289 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions…|exfiltrate\|phone.home\|send.*to.*server\|upload.*data\|rm -rf /\|delete.*all\|chmod 777\|0\.0\.0\.0\|mkfifo\|nc -l\|reverse.shell\|>/etc/\|curl.*|.*bash\|wget.*|.*s…Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈918 tok
1 file · 3 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe to network utility≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim zurbrick: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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