Skills/ClawHub/skill-kit

skill-kit@0.11.1

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Claude Code skill management. Topics — writer (create), lint (validate + fix frontmatter), merge (combine related), dedup (find duplicates), convert (agent → skill), architecture (multi-topic structure), upgrade (enhance + add topics), route (topic placement), trigger (declare + auto-register hooks), find (discover via npx skills CLI), graph (extract depends-on + topic body Skill calls into Edge Table + Mermaid + dispatched d3 force-directed render), language (per-skill language consistency enforcement), portability (public skill cross-ref + vendor isolation), publish-scope (published skill scope review before extending), invoke-discipline (slash command → Skill tool call, multi-topic Read, post-decision auto-invoke, interactive script, vendor dispatch). Use when: "skill writer", "skill lint", "skill merge", "skill dedup", "create skill", "frontmatter fix", "multi-topic skill", "convert agent", "skill upgrade", "add topic", "topic route", "trigger compile", "hook auto register", "find skill", "discover skill", "npx skills", "skills.sh", "install skill", "skill graph", "skill dependency graph", "depends-on extract", "mermaid skill graph", "force-directed skill graph", "skill language", "description language", "portability", "publish scope", "slash command tool call", "Skill tool missing", "multi-topic read", "invoke discipline", "post-decision skill invoke", "interactive script"." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher drumrobot · joined 0 days agoInstalls 2,814Last detonated 6 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-27 and scored it 65/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Leet speak prompt injection; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/skillspector_lint.py:193 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Leet speak prompt injectionlint.md:644 · Leet speak prompt injection — obfuscated 'override instructions'Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST01
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/skillspector_lint.py:183 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:74 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/trigger-compile.sh:400 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:22 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:8 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/skillspector_lint.py:183 · Remote installer piped to shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:71 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/trigger-compile.sh:395 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

What would make this Verified

15 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
  2. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim drumrobot: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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