Skills/ClawHub/skill-hardfloor

skill-hardfloor@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Protects against malicious or compromised OpenClaw skills by auditing newly installed skills before first use, detecting red-flag patterns, and enforcing har..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher kimmi2ue · publishing for 191 daysInstalls 735Last detonated 22 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 60/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Rule modification attempt; Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

CRITICAL
Rule modification attemptSKILL.md:87 · Rule modification attempt — overwriting existing instructions## Rule 5: The "Would I Hide This?" TestFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesSKILL.md:73 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files| Modify SOUL.md, AGENTS.md, or MEMORY.md unless the user directly asked | Core identity tampering |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:40 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Instructions to read API key files, config files, credential files, or `.env` files and do anything with the content other than use it locally for its stated purposeFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Rule modification attemptSKILL.md:34 · Rule modification attempt — overwriting existing instructions## Rule 2: Red Flag PatternsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
CRITICAL
Rule modification attemptSKILL.md:63 · Rule modification attempt — overwriting existing instructions## Rule 3: Hard Floor (Non-Negotiable)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesSKILL.md:53 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files- Instructions to modify AGENTS.md, SOUL.md, MEMORY.md, or any other core workspace files without the user askingFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
CRITICAL
Rule modification attemptSKILL.md:79 · Rule modification attempt — overwriting existing instructions## Rule 4: Scope BindingFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:57 · Prompt injection — explicit attempt to bypass safety measures- Instructions to ignore, override, or bypass safety guidelinesFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Persistence: instructs the agent to auto-load this skill in future sessionsSKILL.md:48 · Persistence: instructs the agent to auto-load this skill in future sessions- A trigger condition that activates on every message regardless of topic (e.g., "always run this skill," "apply to all requests")Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
CRITICAL
Rule modification attemptSKILL.md:16 · Rule modification attempt — overwriting existing instructions## Rule 1: New Skill QuarantineFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,358 tok
1 file · 3 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

20 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kimmi2ue: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
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