Skills/ClawHub/skill-from-memory

skill-from-memory@0.1.2

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Convert memory, conversation history, or completed tasks into publishable OpenClaw skills. Use when (1) A task or workflow should be reusable, (2) Extracting..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher zfanmy · publishing for 278 daysInstalls 3,987Last detonated 25 min ago
$clawhub install skill-from-memory
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
5 of 5 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexited 1:
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexited 1:
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocess5 of 5 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/extract-from-history.sh:89 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesgrep -E "(脚本|script|备份|backup|定时|cron|任务|task|自动化|automate)" "$OUTPUT_DIR/conversation.txt" | head -20 > "$OUTPUT_DIR/patterns.txt" || trueFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/extract-from-memory.sh:75 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files[ -s "$OUTPUT_DIR/todos.txt" ] && echo "- TODOs: $(wc -l < "$OUTPUT_DIR/todos.txt") items" >> "$OUTPUT_DIR/extraction-summary.md"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorySKILL.md:195 · References a credential file in the home directory# Add ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub to GitHub Settings → SSH KeysFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:195 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Add ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub to GitHub Settings → SSH KeysFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/extract-from-memory.sh:77 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files[ -s "$OUTPUT_DIR/code_blocks.txt" ] && echo "- Code blocks: $(wc -l < "$OUTPUT_DIR/code_blocks.txt") lines" >> "$OUTPUT_DIR/extraction-summary.md"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/create-skill.sh:150 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$SKILL_DIR/scripts/main.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/create-skill.sh:98 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$SKILL_DIR/scripts/extracted-code.sh" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/extract-from-history.sh:100 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesgrep -E "(bash|python|#!/bin)" "$OUTPUT_DIR/conversation.txt" | head -10 > "$OUTPUT_DIR/code_hints.txt" || trueFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/extract-from-memory.sh:76 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files[ -s "$OUTPUT_DIR/completed.txt" ] && echo "- Completed: $(wc -l < "$OUTPUT_DIR/completed.txt") items" >> "$OUTPUT_DIR/extraction-summary.md"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,459 tok
1 file · 7 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.