Skills/ClawHub/skill-download-tracker

skill-download-tracker@1.584.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Monitor download counts for your ClawHub-published skills. Track changes over time, generate daily/weekly/monthly reports, and push notifications via Feishu." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher tsag1 · publishing for 131 daysInstalls 771Last detonated 2d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetest_clawhub_tracker.py:328 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicefor invalid in ['', ' ', '; rm -rf /', '../etc/passwd', 'foo bar', 'slug;whoami', '$(id)', 'Aaa', '-dash-start']:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetest_clawhub_tracker.py:434 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceinvalid_cases = ["; rm -rf /", "../etc/passwd", "FOO", "-leading-dash", "with space"]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetest_clawhub_tracker.py:337 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceresult = tracker.fetch("; rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:135 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files| Empty skills.csv | Send "no skills to monitor" notice to Feishu, exit |Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:102 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesConfigure via env vars or `~/.openclaw/workspace/data/clawhub-tracker/.env`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedclawhub_tracker.py:214 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:134 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files| Missing .env | Skip Feishu push, continue with local files |Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsclawhub_tracker.py:39 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_env_path = os.path.join(DATA_DIR, ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsclawhub_tracker.py:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# 从环境变量或 .env 文件读取飞书凭证（不硬编码）Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtest_clawhub_tracker.py:328 · Destructive file system command detectedfor invalid in ['', ' ', '; rm -rf /', '../etc/passwd', 'foo bar', 'slug;whoami', '$(id)', 'Aaa', '-dash-start']:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest_clawhub_tracker.py:328 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor invalid in ['', ' ', '; rm -rf /', '../etc/passwd', 'foo bar', 'slug;whoami', '$(id)', 'Aaa', '-dash-start']:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtest_clawhub_tracker.py:337 · Destructive file system command detectedresult = tracker.fetch("; rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtest_clawhub_tracker.py:434 · Destructive file system command detectedinvalid_cases = ["; rm -rf /", "../etc/passwd", "FOO", "-leading-dash", "with space"]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest_clawhub_tracker.py:434 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesinvalid_cases = ["; rm -rf /", "../etc/passwd", "FOO", "-leading-dash", "with space"]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,112 tok
1 file · 7 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim tsag1: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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