Skills/ClawHub/skill-distribution

skill-distribution@0.1.1

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "Publish and distribute an agent skill (SKILL.md) so people can find and install it — skills.sh, ClawHub, agentskill.sh, GitHub, the Hermes hub, Claude Code plugin marketplaces and Anthropic's directory, the ChatGPT/Codex plugin directory, Gemini CLI extensions, and paid marketplaces. Use whenever the user has written a skill and asks how to share, publish, upload, list, submit, release, sell, or get installs for it, asks where skills are discovered, asks about the rules or format a registry requires, or wants to turn a skill into a plugin — even if they only name one marketplace." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher oxde · joined 0 days agoInstalls 208Last detonated 2 h ago
$clawhub install skill-distribution
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Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-11-04 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/check_skill.py:103 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:32 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06