Skills/ClawHub/skill-creator2

skill-creator2@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Create new skills, modify and improve existing skills, and measure skill performance. Use when users want to create a skill from scratch, edit, or optimize a..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher zhanggd6 · publishing for 163 daysInstalls 733Last detonated 7 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 59/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/generate_report.py:41 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Poppins:wght@500;600&family=Lora:wght@400;500&display=swap" rel="stylesheet">Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionagents/grader.md:103 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files1. If `{outputs_dir}/metrics.json` exists, read it and include in grading outputFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/run_loop.py:313 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files(results_dir / "results.json").write_text(json_output)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:205 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…orce assertions onto things that need human judgment. Update the `eval_metadata.json` files and `evals/evals.json` with the assertions once drafted. Also explain to the user what they'll see in the viewer — both the qualitative outputs and…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/improve_description.py:35 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionagents/grader.md:83 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesSave results to `{outputs_dir}/../grading.json` (sibling to outputs_dir).Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedeval-viewer/generate_review.py:291 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandeval-viewer/generate_review.py:445 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Port still in use after kill attempt — find a free oneFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/run_eval.py:85 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandSKILL.md:287 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill $VIEWER_PID 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈8,247 tok
1 file · 19 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

21 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim zhanggd6: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim zhanggd6Propose a patch to the maintainer