Skills/ClawHub/skill-admission-gate

skill-admission-gate@1.0.2

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "技能上架安全闸门——一个技能/插件在安装或上架前，先跑确定性安全审查：查破坏性命令、远程执行、数据外泄、提示注入、隐蔽行为、混淆载荷与作用域越界，产出「分级发现 + 闸门判定 + 包指纹证据」。当需要审查第三方 skill、安装来源不明的技能、给自研技能做发布前安检、做供应链安全评估、或需要出具"该包未被篡改且已评估风险"的证据时调用。核心三件事：①按规则集扫全部文件并分级（BLOCK/WARN）②支持"已接受风险"声明（.admission-allow.json，须署名留痕）③输出包指纹与文件哈希作为"有证"产物。触发词：技能安全、审查 skill、安装前检查、恶意技能、skill 安全扫描、上架闸门、供应链安全、这个技能安全吗、第三方技能、能不能装、木马、后门、提示注入。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher zhaoxinghua09-cell · joined 2 days agoInstalls 174Last detonated 35 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-28 and scored it 64/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompt injection attempt; Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompt injection attemptSKILL.md:136 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions'Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:270 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:131 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:135 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:266 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/scan_skill.py:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:267 · Remote installer piped to shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:132 · Remote installer piped to shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/scan_skill.py:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

What would make this Verified

16 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
  2. Asks the agent to act silently or skip confirmation≈ +8 on the totalRemove "do not tell the user", "without asking", "disable safety" and similar. An agent skill should never ask to be invisible.
  3. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim zhaoxinghua09-cell: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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