shoofly-advanced@1.3.0
BLOCKED· static onlyPublisher claims: "Pre-execution security layer for AI agents. Intercepts and blocks dangerous tool calls before they fire -- not detected after. Works with OpenClaw and Claude..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 39/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; Prompt injection attempt; Prompt injection attempt. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
ignoreFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.- Presence of `<system>`, `[INST]`, `[/INST]` XML/markup tags in external contentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.- Text containing: "ignore previous instructions", "disregard your rules", "new system prompt", "you are now", "act as if you have no restrictions", "DAN", "jailbreak"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.- Reading any of `~/.ssh/`, `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.config/`, keychain access — then immediately making a network requestFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.… Write** - Any write tool call targeting: `/etc/`, `/usr/`, `/bin/`, `/sbin/`, `~/.ssh/`, `~/.aws/`, `~/.config/`, `~/.bashrc`, `~/.zshrc`, `~/.profile`, `~/.bash_pro…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- HTML/markdown comments with instruction content: `<!-- ignore -->`, `<!-- new instruction:`Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.- Reading any of `~/.ssh/`, `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.config/`, keychain access — then immediately making a network requestFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- Any write to a file named: `*.key`, `*.pem`, `*.p12`, `id_rsa`, `credentials`, `.env` outside of an explicitly user-authorized project directoryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- Presence of `<system>`, `[INST]`, `[/INST]` XML/markup tags in external contentFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.- Shell commands that pipe sensitive files to external tools: `cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa | curl`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- Text containing: "ignore previous instructions", "disregard your rules", "new system prompt", "you are now", "act as if you have no restrictions", "DAN", "jailbreak"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.- Reading any of `~/.ssh/`, `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.config/`, keychain access — then immediately making a network requestFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- Shell commands that pipe sensitive files to external tools: `cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa | curl`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- Shell commands that pipe sensitive files to external tools: `cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa | curl`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
41 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim wow-leeroy-jenkins05: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.