Skills/ClawHub/shoofly-advanced

shoofly-advanced@1.3.0

BLOCKED· static only

Publisher claims: "Pre-execution security layer for AI agents. Intercepts and blocks dangerous tool calls before they fire -- not detected after. Works with OpenClaw and Claude..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher wow-leeroy-jenkins05 · publishing for 232 daysInstalls 833Last detonated 59 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 39/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; Prompt injection attempt; Prompt injection attempt. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentSKILL.md:75 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentignoreFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injection attemptSKILL.md:69 · Prompt injection attempt — model control tokens- Presence of `<system>`, `[INST]`, `[/INST]` XML/markup tags in external contentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injection attemptSKILL.md:68 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions'- Text containing: "ignore previous instructions", "disregard your rules", "new system prompt", "you are now", "act as if you have no restrictions", "DAN", "jailbreak"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Reads credential paths from the home directorySKILL.md:94 · Reads credential paths from the home directory- Reading any of `~/.ssh/`, `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.config/`, keychain access — then immediately making a network requestFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:79 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files… Write** - Any write tool call targeting: `/etc/`, `/usr/`, `/bin/`, `/sbin/`, `~/.ssh/`, `~/.aws/`, `~/.config/`, `~/.bashrc`, `~/.zshrc`, `~/.profile`, `~/.bash_pro…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Rule addition attemptSKILL.md:75 · Rule addition attempt — injecting new instructions- HTML/markdown comments with instruction content: `<!-- ignore -->`, `<!-- new instruction:`Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorySKILL.md:94 · References a credential file in the home directory- Reading any of `~/.ssh/`, `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.config/`, keychain access — then immediately making a network requestFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:81 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Any write to a file named: `*.key`, `*.pem`, `*.p12`, `id_rsa`, `credentials`, `.env` outside of an explicitly user-authorized project directoryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Fake instruction boundary tagSKILL.md:69 · Fake instruction boundary tag- Presence of `<system>`, `[INST]`, `[/INST]` XML/markup tags in external contentFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:92 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Shell commands that pipe sensitive files to external tools: `cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa | curl`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:68 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference- Text containing: "ignore previous instructions", "disregard your rules", "new system prompt", "you are now", "act as if you have no restrictions", "DAN", "jailbreak"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:94 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Reading any of `~/.ssh/`, `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.config/`, keychain access — then immediately making a network requestFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Reads credential paths from the home directorySKILL.md:92 · Reads credential paths from the home directory- Shell commands that pipe sensitive files to external tools: `cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa | curl`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorySKILL.md:92 · References a credential file in the home directory- Shell commands that pipe sensitive files to external tools: `cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa | curl`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,558 tok
1 file · 2 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

41 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim wow-leeroy-jenkins05: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  4. Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
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