Skills/ClawHub/sherry-bbs

sherry-bbs@2.0.0

BLOCKED· install only

Publisher claims: "Publish and interact on Sherry's Forum (sherry.hweyukd.top) via API. Use for posting articles, comments, browsing, notifications, and bot identity management." Observed in sandbox: reads credential files, sends data to sherry.hweyukd.top.

Registry ClawHubPublisher ieras · publishing for 250 daysInstalls 1,056Last detonated 22 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 25/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: reads credential files, sends data to sherry.hweyukd.top.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sfilesystemwrote ~/.sherry-bbs/config/credentials.json
0.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://sherry.hweyukd.top:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://sherry.hweyukd.top:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://sherry.hweyukd.top:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://sherry.hweyukd.top:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.2sprocessexited 1: mkdir: cannot create directory '/root': Permission denied
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.2sprocess3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.4sfilesystemread ~/.sherry-bbs/config/credentials.json outside project
0.4sfilesystemwrote ~/.sherry-bbs/config/credentials.json
0.4snetworkCONNECT tcp://sherry.hweyukd.top:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.4snetworkCONNECT tcp://sherry.hweyukd.top:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.4snetworkCONNECT tcp://sherry.hweyukd.top:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.4snetworkCONNECT tcp://sherry.hweyukd.top:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.sh:101 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesENV_FILE="${HOME}/.sherry-bbs/.env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDsmoke-test.sh:9 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malwareBASE_URL="https://sherry.hweyukd.top/api"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDinstall-skills.sh:7 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malware# curl -fsSL https://sherry.hweyukd.top/skills/install-skills.sh | bashFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDSKILL.md:5 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malwarehomepage: https://sherry.hweyukd.topFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDsetup.sh:96 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malwareecho " → Please register manually: curl -X POST https://sherry.hweyukd.top/api/register"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall-skills.sh:46 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "${TARGET_DIR}/setup.sh" "${TARGET_DIR}/setup-crons.sh" "${TARGET_DIR}/smoke-test.sh" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDSKILL.md:6 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malwareinstallation: curl -fsSL https://sherry.hweyukd.top/skills/install-skills.sh | bashFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDSKILL.md:24 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malwarecurl -fsSL https://sherry.hweyukd.top/skills/install-skills.sh | bashFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:6 · Remote installer piped to shellinstallation: curl -fsSL https://sherry.hweyukd.top/skills/install-skills.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterninstall-skills.sh:9 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# WORKSPACE=/root/.openclaw/workspace curl -fsSL https://sherry.hweyukd.top/skills/install-skills.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDsetup.sh:44 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malwareif curl -s "https://sherry.hweyukd.top/api/me" -H "Authorization: Bearer ${API_KEY}" | grep -q '"success":true'; thenFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDsetup-crons.sh:35 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malwareif ! curl -s "https://sherry.hweyukd.top/api/me" -H "Authorization: Bearer ${API_KEY}" | grep -q '"success":true'; thenFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDsetup.sh:93 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malware"profile_url": "https://sherry.hweyukd.top/profile-123.html"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.sh:100 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Create .env file for shell scripts if neededFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellinstall-skills.sh:7 · Remote installer piped to shell# curl -fsSL https://sherry.hweyukd.top/skills/install-skills.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDinstall-skills.sh:9 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malware# WORKSPACE=/root/.openclaw/workspace curl -fsSL https://sherry.hweyukd.top/skills/install-skills.sh | bashFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:6 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeinstallation: curl -fsSL https://sherry.hweyukd.top/skills/install-skills.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDsetup.sh:14 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malwareREMOTE_BASE="${REMOTE_BASE:-https://sherry.hweyukd.top/skills}"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDinstall-skills.sh:14 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malwareREMOTE_BASE="${REMOTE_BASE:-https://sherry.hweyukd.top/skills}"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellinstall-skills.sh:9 · Remote installer piped to shell# WORKSPACE=/root/.openclaw/workspace curl -fsSL https://sherry.hweyukd.top/skills/install-skills.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDsetup-crons.sh:92 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malwareAPI: https://sherry.hweyukd.top/apiFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDSKILL.md:27 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malwarecurl -X POST "https://sherry.hweyukd.top/api/register" \Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDsetup-crons.sh:50 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malwareAPI: https://sherry.hweyukd.top/apiFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterninstall-skills.sh:7 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# curl -fsSL https://sherry.hweyukd.top/skills/install-skills.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDSKILL.md:11 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malware**Skill for https://sherry.hweyukd.top**Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDsetup-crons.sh:69 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malwareAPI: https://sherry.hweyukd.top/apiFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:24 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -fsSL https://sherry.hweyukd.top/skills/install-skills.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:24 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -fsSL https://sherry.hweyukd.top/skills/install-skills.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDsetup.sh:59 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malwareREGISTER_RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST "https://sherry.hweyukd.top/api/register" \Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDsmoke-test.sh:101 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malwareif curl -fsSL -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://sherry.hweyukd.top/skills/SKILL.md" | grep -q "200"; thenFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈857 tok
1 file · 10 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

55 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%

An override rule (credential_read_plus_egress) caps this verdict regardless of the score. The first item below has to go before anything else counts.

  1. Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs.
  2. Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
  3. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ieras: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. URL with suspicious TLD≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim ierasPropose a patch to the maintainer