setlist@1.1.9
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Look up concert setlists and live-music history via setlist.fm. Use when the user asks what songs an artist played at a show, their tour setlists, what was performed at a venue or on a date, or wants to find concerts by artist, venue, city, or year. Triggers on phrases like "what did Radiohead play at...", "Phish setlist for...", "shows at Red Rocks", "what songs were played on this tour", or any request about concert setlists, gigs, tours, or live performances. Requires setlist-mcp installed and the setlist server registered (see Setup below)." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-03 and scored it 62/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
What would make this Verified
18 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim chrischall: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.