self-check@1.0.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "系统自检工具。全面检查环境配置、文件完整性、权限、依赖、API token 等,并汇报问题给出修复建议(但不主动修复)。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
f"sudo chown -R $(whoami):$(whoami) {d}",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.result.add_issue("nvm 不可用", "安装 nvm: curl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.39.0/install.sh | bash", "warning")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result.add_issue("nvm 不可用", "安装 nvm: curl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.39.0/install.sh | bash", "warning")Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result.add_issue("nvm 不可用", "安装 nvm: curl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.39.0/install.sh | bash", "warning")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"sudo chown -R $(whoami):$(whoami) {d}",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim solarise94: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.