Skills/ClawHub/security

security@1.0.12

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "GoPlus AgentGuard — AI agent security guard. Run /agentguard checkup for a full security health check, scans all installed skills, checks credentials, permis..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher 0xbeekeeper · publishing for 211 daysInstalls 5,233Last detonated 5 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
5 of 5 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive command against a filesystem root or device. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.5sprocess5 of 5 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:312 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files3. Check `~/.ssh/` and `~/.gnupg/` directory permissions (should be 700)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- path: "~/.gnupg/"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceSKILL.md:578 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device{"timestamp":"...","tool_name":"Bash","tool_input_summary":"rm -rf /","decision":"deny","risk_level":"critical","risk_tags":["DANGEROUS_COMMAND"],"initiating_skill":"some-skill"}Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Reads credential paths from the home directorySKILL.md:340 · Reads credential paths from the home directory1. Find recently modified files: `find $OC/ ~/.ssh/ ~/.gnupg/ /etc/cron.d/ -type f -mtime -1`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:311 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files2. Scan any `.env*` files under `$OC/` for plaintext credentialsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Host or command assembled from base64 fragmentsSKILL.md:332 · Host or command assembled from base64 fragments4. Scan all cron command bodies using scan-rules.md Rule 2 (AUTO_UPDATE) patterns: `curl|bash`, `wget|sh`, `eval "$(curl`, `base64 -d | bash`Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- path: "~/.ssh/"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/checkup-report.js:798 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Space+Grotesk:wght@300;400;500;600;700&family=Inter:wght@300;400;500;600;700&display=swap" rel="stylesheet"/>Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:603 · Destructive file system command detected| 2025-01-15 14:30 | Bash | rm -rf / | DENY | critical | DANGEROUS_COMMAND | some-skill |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:578 · Destructive file system command detected{"timestamp":"...","tool_name":"Bash","tool_input_summary":"rm -rf /","decision":"deny","risk_level":"critical","risk_tags":["DANGEROUS_COMMAND"],"initiating_skill":"some-skill"}Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceSKILL.md:603 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device| 2025-01-15 14:30 | Bash | rm -rf / | DENY | critical | DANGEROUS_COMMAND | some-skill |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/checkup-report.js:799 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Material+Symbols+Outlined:wght,[email protected],0..1&display=swap" rel="stylesheet"/>Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/checkup-report.js:738 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesautoRecs.push({ severity: 'CRITICAL', text: 'Rotate exposed credentials and fix file permissions on ~/.ssh/ and ~/.gnupg/ directories.', zh: '轮换已暴露的凭证,并修复 ~/.ssh/ 和 ~/.gnupg/ 目录的文件权限。' });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:656 · Remote installer piped to shell5. **[REQUIRED] Scheduled tasks audit** (→ feeds Dimension 3: Network & System): Check `crontab -l 2>/dev/null` for suspicious entries containing `curl|bash`, `wget|sh`, or accessing `~/.ssh/`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:704 · Remote installer piped to shell| No suspicious cron jobs (curl\|bash, wget\|sh, accessing ~/.ssh/) | **+30** | "Suspicious cron job: <command>" (HIGH) |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:332 · Remote installer piped to shell4. Scan all cron command bodies using scan-rules.md Rule 2 (AUTO_UPDATE) patterns: `curl|bash`, `wget|sh`, `eval "$(curl`, `base64 -d | bash`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
LOW
Rule modification attemptscan-rules.md:39 · Rule modification attempt — overwriting existing instructions · informational: not an instruction file## Rule 3: REMOTE_LOADER (CRITICAL)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionscan-rules.md:216 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file| `you\s+are\s+(now\|a)\s+(?:DAN\|jailbroken\|unrestricted)` (i) | Jailbreak attempt |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Rule modification attemptpatrol-checks.md:185 · Rule modification attempt — overwriting existing instructions · informational: not an instruction file### Scan Patterns (cross-ref scan-rules.md Rule 2: AUTO_UPDATE)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Rule modification attemptscan-rules.md:69 · Rule modification attempt — overwriting existing instructions · informational: not an instruction file## Rule 5: READ_SSH_KEYS (CRITICAL)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Rule modification attemptscan-rules.md:27 · Rule modification attempt — overwriting existing instructions · informational: not an instruction file## Rule 2: AUTO_UPDATE (CRITICAL)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:645 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…<path> 2>/dev/null` on `~/.ssh/`, `~/.gnupg/`, and if OpenClaw: on `$OC/openclaw.json`, `$OC/devices/paired.json`. **If the command returns empty output, the directory does not exist — treat as N/A (award full points), do NOT flag a…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Rule modification attemptscan-rules.md:7 · Rule modification attempt — overwriting existing instructions · informational: not an instruction file## Rule 1: SHELL_EXEC (HIGH)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Rule modification attemptscan-rules.md:55 · Rule modification attempt — overwriting existing instructions · informational: not an instruction file## Rule 4: READ_ENV_SECRETS (MEDIUM)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈11,059 tok
1 file · 16 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim 0xbeekeeper: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Obfuscated code≈ +5 on the totalRemove base64-assembled strings, eval of decoded text and minified blobs. Reviewers and scanners both treat unreadable code as hostile.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. Host or command assembled from base64 fragments≈ +4 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
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