security-sentinel@1.0.1
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Scan the workspace for security vulnerabilities, exposed secrets, and misconfigurations." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
if (!['.md', '.js', '.json', '.yml', '.yaml', '.sh', '.env', '.txt'].includes(path.extname(file))) continue;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.results.push(`🚨 Dangerous script detected in ${fullPath} script '${name}': curl | bash`);Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.3. **Permission Check**: Verifies critical files (`package.json`, `.env`) are not world-writable.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if (cmd.includes('rm -rf /')) {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.results.push(`🚨 Critical Risk: 'rm -rf /' detected in ${fullPath} script '${name}'`);Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.results.push(`🚨 Critical Risk: 'rm -rf /' detected in ${fullPath} script '${name}'`);Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.const CRITICAL_FILES = ['package.json', '.env', 'openclaw.json'];Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if (file === 'index.js' || file === 'scan.js' || file.endsWith('.env')) continue;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if (cmd.includes('rm -rf /')) {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if (cmd.includes('curl') && cmd.includes('| bash')) {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.results.push(`🚨 Dangerous script detected in ${fullPath} script '${name}': curl | bash`);Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim autogame-17: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.