searxng-search-cli@1.3.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Use self-hosted SearXNG search engine (Free, Self-hosted, Auto-deploy, Multi-Channel). SearXNG is a free meta search engine that aggregates 200+ search engin..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True, env=env, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.run('curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh')Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.secret = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.run('curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh')Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=cwd)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.if not subprocess.run("which uv", shell=True, capture_output=True).returncode == 0:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.log(f"⚠ 需要手动复制: sudo cp {limiter_src} {limiter_dst}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim leeshunee: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.