Skills/ClawHub/reverse-proxy-local

reverse-proxy-local@1.0.1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Connect OpenClaw to the internet via Tailscale Funnel. Use when user says "connect with ecto", "setup ecto connection", "expose openclaw publicly", or "enable external access"." Observed in sandbox: calls raw.githubusercontent.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher tsheasha · publishing for 290 daysInstalls 2,863Last detonated 55 min ago
$clawhub install reverse-proxy-local
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
5 of 5 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: calls raw.githubusercontent.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://raw.githubusercontent.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.1sprocessexited 127: ./scripts/connect.sh: line 70: brew: command not found
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/head
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocess5 of 5 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/connect.sh:94 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesif ! sudo tailscale status &> /dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/connect.sh:96 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo /opt/homebrew/bin/tailscaled --state=/var/lib/tailscale/tailscaled.state &Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/disconnect.sh:25 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo tailscale serve reset 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLscripts/connect.sh:58 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code source/bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh)"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:64 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges- sudo access (for Tailscale service)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/connect.sh:110 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesif sudo tailscale status 2>/dev/null | grep -q "@"; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/status.sh:41 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFUNNEL_STATUS=$(sudo tailscale funnel status 2>/dev/null || echo "not running")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/connect.sh:192 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$CREDENTIALS_FILE"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/connect.sh:82 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesif sudo tailscale status &> /dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/package-for-friend.sh:32 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$OUTPUT_DIR/test-connection.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/connect.sh:89 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo brew services start tailscale 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/status.sh:29 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesHOSTNAME=$(sudo tailscale status --json 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.Self.DNSName' | sed 's/\.$//' || echo "unknown")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:111 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- sudo accessFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:64 · Authorization escalation language- sudo access (for Tailscale service)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/status.sh:26 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesTS_STATUS=$(sudo tailscale status 2>/dev/null || echo "not running")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/disconnect.sh:24 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo tailscale funnel --https=443 off 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈585 tok
1 file · 8 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.