reverse-proxy-local@1.0.1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Connect OpenClaw to the internet via Tailscale Funnel. Use when user says "connect with ecto", "setup ecto connection", "expose openclaw publicly", or "enable external access"." Observed in sandbox: calls raw.githubusercontent.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 5 of 5 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: calls raw.githubusercontent.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
if ! sudo tailscale status &> /dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo /opt/homebrew/bin/tailscaled --state=/var/lib/tailscale/tailscaled.state &Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo tailscale serve reset 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell./bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh)"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.- sudo access (for Tailscale service)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if sudo tailscale status 2>/dev/null | grep -q "@"; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.FUNNEL_STATUS=$(sudo tailscale funnel status 2>/dev/null || echo "not running")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod 600 "$CREDENTIALS_FILE"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.if sudo tailscale status &> /dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod +x "$OUTPUT_DIR/test-connection.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.sudo brew services start tailscale 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.HOSTNAME=$(sudo tailscale status --json 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.Self.DNSName' | sed 's/\.$//' || echo "unknown")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- sudo accessFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.- sudo access (for Tailscale service)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.TS_STATUS=$(sudo tailscale status 2>/dev/null || echo "not running")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo tailscale funnel --https=443 off 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.