Skills/ClawHub/researchclaw-2

researchclaw-2@0.1.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Automate setup, configuration, execution, monitoring, and troubleshooting of AutoResearchClaw — the 23-stage autonomous research pipeline that generates conference-grade papers. Use when the user mentions ResearchClaw, wants to write a research paper autonomously, needs to set up or debug the pipeline, or says research paper, autonomous research, or paper generation." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher othmanadi · publishing for 103 daysInstalls 385Last detonated 7d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:243 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges| `Docker` errors | Docker not running or permission denied | Run `docker info` to verify; may need `sudo usermod -aG docker $USER` |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsSKILL.md:108 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering3. **API key**: Provide your API key, or the environment variable name that holds it (e.g., `OPENAI_API_KEY`)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:78 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges4. **LaTeX**: Check `pdflatex --version`. If missing, suggest `sudo apt-get install texlive-full` (Linux) or `brew install --cask mactex` (macOS). **Be honest: this is a large download (2-4 GB).**Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:244 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges| `pdflatex` not found | LaTeX not installed | Install with `sudo apt-get install texlive-full` |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:94 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges- Install LaTeX without sudo on LinuxFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:215 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files2. Find the last completed stage: check `pipeline_summary.json` or find the highest-numbered `stage-*` directory with output filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directoryassets/config-template.yaml:31 · References a credential file in the home directory# key_path: "~/.ssh/id_rsa"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsassets/config-template.yaml:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# key_path: "~/.ssh/id_rsa"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,142 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim othmanadi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim othmanadiPropose a patch to the maintainer