report-creator@1.23.1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Use when the user wants to CREATE or GENERATE a report, business summary, data dashboard, or research doc — 报告/数据看板/商业报告/研究文档/KPI仪表盘. Handles Chinese and Eng..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 12 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
Summary card overlay (always present) — left+right panels injected by buildCard()Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Export (always present)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.if importlib.util.find_spec("playwright") is None:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."message": "scripts/verify-release.py: subprocess.run(",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.cleanup_completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Edit mode (always present)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.❌ Never combine data-target-value with kpi-suffix span — countUp will overwrite the spanFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.spec.loader.exec_module(mod)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.CDN libraries (add only what's needed; omit if --bundle, inline instead)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.❌ Never put long units directly as plain text contentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.