release-readiness-check@1.0.0
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "上线前五分钟体检、发布前检查、上线卡点、release readiness、一条命令跑完 Dockerfile / K8s 清单 / SQL 迁移 / OpenAPI 兼容 / .env 配置五项检查并汇总成一份报告。当用户说「能不能上线」「上线前检查一下」「发布前体检」「帮我看看这次上线有没有风险」「上线 checklist 跑一遍」「CI 加个上线门禁」时使用。附纯标准库脚本 scripts/release_check.py,自动发现目标目录里的 Dockerfile、含 kind 的 K8s YAML、*.sql 迁移、openapi 规范、.env 文件,逐项用子进程调用内置的五个独立检查器,汇总为 Markdown 报告(总览表 → 各项 top 问题 → 门禁结论)。门禁三态:有 high 判「不建议上线」;无 high 但有项拿不到证据(子脚本崩溃、旧规范为空/无 paths、只有 Helm 模板、缺 .env 示例)判「无法判断,缺 N 项证据」并同样不放行;全部项都有结论且无 high 才是「可以上线」。目录里没有这类文件算「不适用」,不影响放行。支持 --json、--strict 做 CI 门禁(有 high 或有无法判断项则退出码 1)、--skip 显式豁免某项、--openapi-base 比对旧规范。" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-10-30 and scored it 48/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
What would make this Verified
32 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim po-et: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.