reinstall-openclaw@1.0.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Safely uninstall and reinstall OpenClaw while preserving user configurations, credentials, memory files, skills, and custom settings. Includes backup and res..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
LATEST_BACKUP=$(ls -td ~/openclaw-backup-* | head -1) && cp -r $LATEST_BACKUP/* ~/.openclaw/ && chmod 700 ~/.openclaw && echo "Restored from: $LATEST_BACKUP"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.kill <PID>Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.npx openclaw uninstall --state --workspace --yesFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx openclaw uninstall --all --yesFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.sudo npm uninstall -g openclawFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod 700 ~/.openclaw/credentialsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.sudo npm install -g openclaw@latestFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.npx openclaw --versionFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.chmod 700 ~/.openclawFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.npx openclaw gateway stopFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx openclaw --versionFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.sudo npm install -g openclaw@latestFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod 600 ~/.openclaw/openclaw.jsonFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod 700 ~/.openclawFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim albertpan2018: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Unpinned dependencies≈ +1 on the totalPin exact versions (and ideally hashes) in package.json, requirements or the install script so the bundle cannot change under you.