Skills/ClawHub/redline-annotate

redline-annotate@1.0.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "在 AI 生成的 HTML 网页上做可视化标注，把"点元素 + 写评论"的反馈通过本地 server + UserPromptSubmit hook 自动喂回模型，无需复制粘贴。当用户说"标注网页"、"给这个 HTML 加批注"、"/annotate"、或希望对生成的网页提具体元素修改意见时触发。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher times77 · publishing for 176 daysInstalls 768Last detonated 43 min ago
$clawhub install redline-annotate
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Coverage

Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/ln
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.3sfilesystemread ~/.claude/settings.json outside project
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/readlink

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:26 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$SKILL_DIR"/*.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandSKILL.md:101 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes- 杀 server：`kill $(cat ~/.claude/redline/server.pid)`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanduninstall.sh:19 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$PID" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandinjector.sh:58 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes[[ -n "$pid" ]] && kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:25 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# ---------- 1. chmod ----------Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanduninstall.sh:18 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif [[ -n "$PID" ]] && kill -0 "$PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈653 tok
1 file · 16 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.