Skills/ClawHub/rabbit-claude-md

rabbit-claude-md@0.5.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Audit, tighten, and restructure CLAUDE.md and AGENTS.md memory files so the root file stays a short "where am I" plus rules instead of a changelog. Use when the user asks to audit, improve, clean up, shrink, or split a CLAUDE.md or AGENTS.md, says their memory file is too long, stale, or being ignored, wants gotchas moved to docs or per-module memory files, or mentions CLAUDE.md / AGENTS.md maintenance or project memory. Reports named failure modes with evidence and a per-item disposition plan before touching anything, and holds the prose to the active voice profile." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher whit3rabbit · publishing for 70 daysInstalls 369Last detonated 8 h ago
$clawhub install rabbit-claude-md
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/registers.json:8 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"partial": "the vocabulary tiers drop the words carrying real technical meaning, from lexicon.json's technical_exempt. Not an allowance, which would let a second `delve` through; a named exemption lisFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/claude_check.py:724 · Python subprocess execution detectedlast = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Dense URL-encoded contentscripts/rwlib/facts.py:115 · Dense URL-encoded content — may be obfuscating payloads# non-ASCII anchor, `(#%E5%AD%97%E5%B9%95)`, is not a URL by URL_RX and survivesFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/claude_hook.py:197 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(argv, stdout=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandvoices/whit3rabbit.rules.json:75 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"rx": "(?i)\\b(battle ?rhythm|kill chain|in the trenches|war ?room|weaponi[sz]e[ds]?|force multiplier|troops on the ground|boots on the ground)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/claude_hook.py:285 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(argv, input=text.encode("utf-8"),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/claude_check.py:730 · Python subprocess execution detectedcount = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/scan.py:1425 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsrefuses chmod still gets the write, which is the point. Two callers doingFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/claude_check.py:733 · Python subprocess execution detectedwhen = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesscripts/claude_check.py:947 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction filenotes.append("AGENTS.md detected without a companion CLAUDE.md. "Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,034 tok
1 file · 58 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.