qwencloud-deploy@1.0.3
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "One-click deploy, publish, and update a local project or Git repository to Alibaba Cloud International (alibabacloud.com), producing an accessible online service with a public IP. Supports full-stack ROS orchestration, automatic cloud-resource provisioning, pre-deployment price confirmation." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
chmod +x /usr/local/lib/docker/cli-plugins/docker-composeFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.rm -rf /opt/qwencloud.prevFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.[ -f /etc/qwencloud/db.env ] && install -m 600 /etc/qwencloud/db.env ./.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.rm -f \"\$STAGING_DIR/app.tar.gz\"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -rf \"\$STAGING_DIR\"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# compose auto-loads .env from the same directory; if RDS env exists, export it to .env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.f"echo '{encoded}' | base64 -d > /tmp/qwencloud-main.sh\n"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.# Keep .env perms in sync with db.env (0600): db.env holds the DB password, and aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.rm -rf \"\$STAGING_DIR\"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -f /tmp/static.tar.gzFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -rf /opt/qwencloud.failedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -rf /opt/qwencloud.prevFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -f \"\$STAGING_DIR/app.tar.gz\"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -rf \"\$STATIC_STAGING\"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -rf \"\$STAGING_DIR\"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -f \"\$STAGING_DIR/app.tar.gz\"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.install -m 600 /etc/qwencloud/db.env ./.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"chmod +x /tmp/qwencloud-main.sh\n"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.rm -f /tmp/static.tar.gzFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."{ touch /var/log/qwencloud-bootstrap.log; chmod 600 /var/log/qwencloud-bootstrap.log; }",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=isinstance(cmd, str), check=check,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(["aliyun", "ossadmin", "OpenOssService"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.{ touch /var/log/qwencloud-bootstrap.log; chmod 600 /var/log/qwencloud-bootstrap.log; }Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x /usr/local/lib/docker/cli-plugins/docker-composeFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod 600 /etc/qwencloud/db.envFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x "$ARGV0" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod +x "$ARGV0" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cuixiaoyang123: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Obfuscated code≈ +5 on the totalRemove base64-assembled strings, eval of decoded text and minified blobs. Reviewers and scanners both treat unreadable code as hostile.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Host or command assembled from base64 fragments≈ +4 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.