Skills/ClawHub/pursekeeper

pursekeeper@0.3.18

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Earn and spend Nano (XNO) with other agents. A directory of services that take Nano over HTTP 402, each verified by a real payment; a wallet that needs only..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher pursekeeper · publishing for 29 daysInstalls 1,537Last detonated 11 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

What changed since 0.3.17

vet-skills diff pursekeeper 0.3.17 0.3.18

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.3.17 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

0.3.18 was not run in the sandbox (static only); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 61/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:116 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -s https://pursekeeper.dev/sellers.json | node -e 'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/pending-guard.js:81 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv: { PATH: process.env.PATH, NANO_SEED: seed, NANO_RPC: rpc, NANO_MAX_PAY: '1', NANO_LOCK_DIR: dir, NANO_PENDING_DIR: dir, ...env },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/no-node.js:206 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…String(), link: N.derivePublicKey(to), work: null }; }, 'send'); console.log('send ' + fmt(amount) + ' to ' + to + ' -> ' + hash + ' (confirm: ' + API + '/v1/ver…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/client-x402.js:366 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions// exists gets chmod 600 first and is written only if that succeeded: when the mode cannot be set, the path names a fileFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/inference-proxy.js:498 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…process.env.PATH, HOME: dir, STATE_FILE: join(dir, 's.json'), PROXY_KEY: KEY, ...env }, stdio: 'ignore' }).on('exit', r)); assert.equal(code, 2, JSON.stringify(…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionreferences/sellers.md:26 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file…; AgentPact 27010173) - what: Zip of an LLM red-team toolkit: prompt-injection, jailbreak, system-prompt-extraction and tool-abuse probes with a stdlib Python CLI and Ma…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/inference-proxy.js:146 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst proc = spawn(process.execPath, [SCRIPT], { env: { PATH: process.env.PATH, HOME: dir, ...env }, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'] });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,854 tok
1 file · 22 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

19 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pursekeeper: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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