Skills/ClawHub/pulse-board

pulse-board@1.1.3

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Universal operational digest for agent skill stacks. Every scheduled skill logs its outcome with log-append.sh. Twice daily, digest-agent.sh reads the log, c..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher littlejakub · publishing for 256 daysInstalls 1,362Last detonated 24 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 5 of 5 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Telegram Bot API URL; Fake instruction boundary tag; Telegram Bot API URL. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/clear
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/tr
0.0sprocessexited 1: ./install.sh: line 35: REPLY: unbound variable
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexited 1: deliver.sh: message file required.
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sfilesystemread ~/.pulse-board/config/pulse.yaml outside project
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/head
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
0.1sprocessexited 2:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: Error: --skill is required.
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sfilesystemread ~/.pulse-board/config/pulse.yaml outside project
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/head
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocess5 of 5 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/clear
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/tr
0.2sprocessexited 1: ./install.sh: line 35: REPLY: unbound variable

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedinstall.sh:301 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(['crontab', '-'], input=new_crontab, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedplug.sh:82 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(['crontab', '-l'], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Telegram Bot API URLdeliver.sh:52 · Telegram Bot API URL — data will be sent to Telegramcurl -sf -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
CRITICAL
Fake instruction boundary tagSKILL.md:57 · Fake instruction boundary tag- **OpenClaw agent:** `openclaw agent --agent <id> --message <prompt> --json` (local gateway call)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:147 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionscd ~/.openclaw/skills/pulse-board && git pull && chmod +x *.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedplug.sh:89 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(['crontab', '-'], input=new_crontab, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedinstall.sh:294 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(['crontab', '-l'], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Telegram Bot API URLSKILL.md:55 · Telegram Bot API URL — data will be sent to Telegram- **Telegram:** `POST https://api.telegram.org/bot<token>/sendMessage`Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:71 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x ~/.openclaw/skills/pulse-board/*.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedplug.sh:96 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(['crontab', '-l'], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Fake instruction boundary tagCHANGELOG.md:78 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction file- Agent is called via `openclaw agent --agent <id> --message <prompt> --json`Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,282 tok
1 file · 9 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim littlejakub: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  3. Telegram Bot API URL≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim littlejakubPropose a patch to the maintainer