Skills/ClawHub/proxybase-openclaw-skill

proxybase-openclaw-skill@1.0.12

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Purchase and manage SOCKS5 residential proxies via ProxyBase API with cryptocurrency payments. Supports order creation, payment polling, proxy delivery, band..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher proxybase-user · publishing for 249 daysInstalls 1,817Last detonated 58 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; Credential pass-through configuration; Credential pass-through configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.1sprocessexited 1: ./test_security.sh: line 11: /tmp/ks-detonate-92rURb/scripts/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/proxybase/lib/common.sh: No such file or directory
0.1sprocess2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetest_security.sh:106 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceassert_fail "reject order_id with semicolon" validate_safe_string 'id;rm -rf /' "order_id"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationSKILL.md:309 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials- **Proxy credentials** (username, password, host, port): Only alphanumericFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationproxybase.sh:15 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials# rotate <order_id> Rotate proxy credentialsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetest_security.sh:85 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceassert_fail "reject host with semicolon" validate_safe_string 'host;rm -rf /' "host"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationSKILL.md:184 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials**Rotate proxy credentials (new IP):**Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetest_security.sh:56 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceassert_fail "reject username with semicolon" validate_safe_string 'pb_user;rm -rf /' "username"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationproxybase.sh:634 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials# Validate proxy credentials from API response (prevents shell injection)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedtest_security.sh:85 · Destructive file system command detectedassert_fail "reject host with semicolon" validate_safe_string 'host;rm -rf /' "host"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationproxybase.sh:636 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsecho "ERROR: API returned proxy credentials with invalid characters (possible compromise)" >&2Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationproxybase.sh:955 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsecho " $OID: SECURITY WARNING — proxy credentials contain invalid characters" >&2Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandproxybase.sh:127 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$_FILE"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedtest_security.sh:106 · Destructive file system command detectedassert_fail "reject order_id with semicolon" validate_safe_string 'id;rm -rf /' "order_id"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedtest_security.sh:56 · Destructive file system command detectedassert_fail "reject username with semicolon" validate_safe_string 'pb_user;rm -rf /' "username"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationproxybase.sh:947 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials# Validate proxy credentials before storingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:322 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesor the local `orders.json` state file — never from raw user chat input withoutFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialstest_security.sh:133 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingassert_fail "reject proxy_url wrong protocol" validate_safe_string 'http://user:pass@host:1080' "proxy_url"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstest_security.sh:322 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesRESULT=$(bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/proxybase.sh" status '|cat /etc/passwd' 2>&1) || trueFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedtest_security.sh:70 · Destructive file system command detectedassert_fail "reject password with \$(...)" validate_safe_string '$(rm -rf /)' "password"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstest_security.sh:108 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert_fail "reject order_id with slash" validate_safe_string 'order/../../etc/passwd' "order_id"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandproxybase.sh:115 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$_FILE"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstest_security.sh:57 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert_fail "reject username with pipe" validate_safe_string 'user|cat /etc/passwd' "username"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstest_security.sh:73 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert_fail "reject password with pipe" validate_safe_string 'pass|cat /etc/shadow' "password"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,832 tok
1 file · 6 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim proxybase-user: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim proxybase-userPropose a patch to the maintainer