Skills/ClawHub/proxmox-ops

proxmox-ops@1.2.1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Ops-focused Proxmox VE management via REST API — monitor, control, provision, and troubleshoot VMs and LXC containers with battle-tested operational patterns. Use when asked to: - List, start, stop, restart VMs or LXC containers - Check node status, cluster health, or resource usage - Create, clone, or delete VMs and containers - Manage snapshots, backups, storage, or templates - Resize disks (API + in-guest filesystem steps) - Query guest agent for IP addresses - View tasks or system event logs Includes helper script (pve.sh) with auto node discovery from VMID, operational safety gates (read-only vs reversible vs destructive), vmstate snapshot warnings, post-resize guest filesystem steps, and a separate provisioning reference. Requires: curl, jq. Credentials: PROXMOX_HOST, PROXMOX_TOKEN_ID, PROXMOX_TOKEN_SECRET — set as env vars or stored in ~/.proxmox-credentials (sourced at runtime, user-created, mode 600). Writes: ~/.proxmox-credentials (user-created, API token, mode 600). Network: connects to user-configured Proxmox host only (HTTPS, TLS verification disabled for self-signed certs). Helper script: scripts/pve.sh (relative to this skill) Configuration: ~/.proxmox-credentials" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher eddygk · publishing for 148 daysInstalls 1,890Last detonated 45 min ago
$clawhub install proxmox-ops
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexited 1: ./scripts/pve.sh: line 13: PROXMOX_HOST: Set PROXMOX_HOST
0.0sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:86 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions- **Credential file** (`~/.proxmox-credentials`) is user-created, not auto-generated by this skill. Must be mode 600 (`chmod 600 ~/.proxmox-credentials`). Rotate tokens immediately if exposedFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

No other findings across 787 lines in 8 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,254 tok
1 file · 8 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.