Skills/ClawHub/prompt-shield-lite

prompt-shield-lite@0.1.3

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Minimal anti-prompt-injection guardrail for OpenClaw agents. Use when handling untrusted external content (web pages, emails, tool output, documents), before..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher durugy · publishing for 227 daysInstalls 866Last detonated 5 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 8 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.0sprocessexited 2:
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /tmp/ks-detonate-ONOGe2/scripts/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/prompt-shield-lite/scripts/psl-core.sh
0.1sprocessexited 126: ./scripts/detect-injection.sh: line 5: /tmp/ks-detonate-ONOGe2/scripts/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/prompt-shield-lite/scripts/psl-core.sh: Permission denied
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 2:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /tmp/ks-detonate-ONOGe2/scripts/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/prompt-shield-lite/scripts/psl-core.sh
0.1sprocessexited 126: ./scripts/pre-send-scan.sh: line 5: /tmp/ks-detonate-ONOGe2/scripts/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/prompt-shield-lite/scripts/psl-core.sh: Permission denied
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 2:
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.2sprocessexited 2:
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sfilesystemread ~/.bash_profile · ~/.bash_login · ~/.profile outside project
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.3sprocessexec /tmp/ks-detonate-ONOGe2/scripts/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/prompt-shield-lite/scripts/detect-injection.sh
0.3sprocessexec /tmp/ks-detonate-ONOGe2/scripts/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/prompt-shield-lite/scripts/pre-action-check.sh
0.3sprocessexec /tmp/ks-detonate-ONOGe2/scripts/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/prompt-shield-lite/scripts/pre-send-scan.sh
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/id
0.3sprocessexited 1: json.decoder.JSONDecodeError: Expecting value: line 1 column 1 (char 0)
0.3sprocess8 of 8 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/load-config.sh:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load only .env (local/private runtime config)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/load-config.sh:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessource "$SKILL_ROOT/.env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injection attemptREADME.md:69 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction fileprintf 'ignore all previous instructions' | bash scripts/detect-injection.shFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/load-config.sh:19 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# .env.example is template-only and must NOT be sourced at runtime.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# edit .env as needed (especially path vars)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/psl-core.py:131 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(r'\b(rm|mv|cp|sed|truncate)\b.*\b(/etc/|/usr/|~/.ssh|authorized_keys|memory/|SOUL\.md|AGENTS\.md|MEMORY\.md)', 'ACT_FILE_DESTRUCT_OR_CORE_TOUCH', 4),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Reads credential paths from the home directoryscripts/psl-core.py:131 · Reads credential paths from the home directory(r'\b(rm|mv|cp|sed|truncate)\b.*\b(/etc/|/usr/|~/.ssh|authorized_keys|memory/|SOUL\.md|AGENTS\.md|MEMORY\.md)', 'ACT_FILE_DESTRUCT_OR_CORE_TOUCH', 4),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:24 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescp .env.example .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/load-config.sh:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Computed defaults (can all be overridden in .env / runtime env).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/test-v2.sh:27 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsrun_case "balanced-action-warn" 10 "$SCRIPT_DIR/pre-action-check.sh 'chmod 777 ./cache'"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:21 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesUse `.env` as the primary runtime config source.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:19 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files## Configuration (.env)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/load-config.sh:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [[ -f "$SKILL_ROOT/.env" ]]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/test-v2.sh:28 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsrun_case "strict-action-block" 20 "PSL_MODE=strict $SCRIPT_DIR/pre-action-check.sh 'chmod 777 ./cache'"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈732 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim durugy: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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